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 You Must Be Joking! 
Are jokes sometimes funnier because they are immoral, 
wonders Scott Woodcock 
Most of us are familiar with two common observations about the intersection of humour 
and morality. First, at least some jokes are immoral and ought to be publicly condemned. 
Sadly, it is all too easy to find examples of racist, sexist, and homophobic humour, some 
of which occur in the most mainstream of sources. For instance, when Seth McFarlane 
hosted the Academy Awards, he sang an opening number that bragged about having 
seen accomplished actresses nude in films that included Boys Don’t Cry, 
Monster, and The Accused. His attempt to trivialize the talent displayed by women in 
such serious and disturbing roles was loathsome, and it was shocking to see it tacitly 
legitimized in a television event with so many viewers. 
Yet the second common observation is sometimes thought to give moral licence to 
comics like McFarlane. This observation is that some jokes seem especially funny 
because they transgress ordinary social norms. We often enjoy ‘edgy’ or ‘offside’ humour 
precisely because of the fact that it so outrageously defies our expectations of what is 
socially appropriate. Moreover, this defiance of status quo conventions often serves a 
useful role in progressive social change. The brutal honesty of Lenny Bruce, Richard 
Pryor, and Joan Rivers arguably helped to break down social boundaries in a positive 
direction, and more recent comics like Dave Chappelle, Louis C. K., and Amy Schumer 
address controversial topics with a balance of reckless abandon and ethical awareness. 
Thus, one frequently hears that comedy should have no limits and that the point of 
subversive humour is to remain free from the constraints of social expectations. 
I think the apparent tension between these two observations is illusory. While it is true 
that no topic should be precluded from comedy and that subversive humour has to risk 
offending those invested in existing moral norms, these facts do not absolve comics from 
a responsibility to use subversive humour in morally justifiable ways. As Lindy 
West convincingly argues, comics need to use the freedom to say whatever they want as 
a power to make the world better rather than worse, and this is especially true if one 
combines humour with topics that carry the potential to victimize persons who do not 
deserve to be targets of amusement. 
Yet the tension between the observations above raises an interesting philosophical 
question: is it sometimes true that immoral features within jokes can increase their comic 
value, rather than detract from it? Jokes with immoral features can nonetheless be funny, 
whether we approve of the jokes or not, so it is interesting to consider whether the 
humour they generate is enhanced or diminished by their immoral content. 
According to comic moralism, a joke can be funny, all things considered, but immoral 
features in the joke tend to undermine its comic value. Strong versions of this thesis 
claim that immoral features always detract from its humour; moderate versions assert 
only that immoral features sometimes diminish the humour at stake. By contrast, comic 
immoralism claims that immoral features sometimes make jokes even funnier, so it 
allows for some jokes to be perversely funny because of their immoral features rather 
than in spite of them. 
Comic moralism is defended by prominent philosophers like Berys Gaut and Noël Carroll, 
and a moderate form of the thesis is surely correct: there are at least some jokes with 
such offensive content that it detracts from the joke’s humour. Yet moderate versions of 
comic moralism and immoralism are consistent, so the question is whether comic 
immoralism is also true. Do some examples exist of jokes with immoral content that 
increases humour? 
In a series of recent papers, Aaron Smuts has argued that moderate comic immoralism is 
false, and he presents some compelling arguments to this effect. First, he reminds us 
that jokes with moral flaws are normally funny for other reasons, like plays on words or 
reversed expectations, that operate independently of the moral flaws. Second, he also 
reminds us that jokes can refer to immoral content without themselves exhibiting moral 
flaws. For example, The Onion often posts stories with sexist or racist content, but their 
ironic distance from this content makes for effective social commentary that creates the 
humour at stake. Thus, jokes can refer to immoral content in outrageous ways without 
being complicit in its immorality. Third, Smuts claims that no psychological explanation 
exists for being amused by what one judges to be immoral. How can one simultaneously 
find part of a joke worthy of both indignation and comic approval? This seems to involve 
a conflict in the mind of an agent for whom negative emotions associated with moral 
disapproval will normally diminish feelings of amusement. 
In ‘Comic Immoralism and Relatively Funny Jokes‘, I reply to Smuts by proposing that 
standards of humour may be relative to particular groups. This sets up a counterexample 
to his argument by allowing racists, sexists, and homophobes to find additional humour in 
immoral content. The psychology of these agents is unfortunately such that no negative 
emotions are generated that would otherwise diminish their amusement. Quite the 
contrary, they find immoral content that much more entertaining and humorous. 
Smuts is certainly aware of the possibility of these agents. The disagreement between us 
rests on whether they count as appropriate litmus tests for comic immoralism. What he, 
and others, claim is that comic immoralism is specifically a thesis about whether humour 
can be enhanced by what agents explicitly judge to be immoral. Racists, sexists, and 
homophobes don’t count as fair examples for comic immoralism, on this view, because 
from their perspective the immoral features of a joke, separated from outrageousness 
and other comic elements, are not perceived as being immoral. Instead, immoral agents 
genuinely endorse false claims about, say, minority groups, women, and members of the 
LGBT community. 
I believe, however, that we ought to assess comic immoralism in a broader sense that 
includes cases in which agents do not perceive immoral content for what it is. This is 
partly because I do not think it is always so easy to disentangle immorality from mere 
outrageousness, and it seems too convenient to say that we must be merely responding 
to outrageousness when we laugh at jokes with immoral content. I also think comic 
immoralism ought to be evaluated in broader terms because we may otherwise fail to 
notice cases in which certain parts of ourselves explicitly judge immoral content as 
immoral, while other parts of ourselves tacitly exhibit biased attitudes that respond 
favourably to morally compromised humour. 
Consider, for example, a study performed by Robert Lynch in which subjects were given 
‘implicit association tests’ to measure implicit preferences regarding gender roles and 
racial bias. Next, the emotional responses of the subjects were measured while watching 
a comedy routine with jokes on topics like pay equity and the dangers to whites in black 
neighbourhoods. Lynch found that ‘the magnitude of the laughter response was specific 
to the content of the jokes and the implicit preferences of the participants’. If results like 
these are correct, then it seems strange to limit our evaluation of comic immoralism to 
only those cases in which agents explicitly judge the immoral content of jokes as 
immoral, since underlying preferences in these agents may be responding to humour in 
the same way as racists, sexists, and homophobes. 
If comic immoralism is false, as Smuts suggests, then a considerable weight is lifted from 
those of us who fear that we sometimes laugh inappropriately at immoral jokes, for it 
would absolve us from complicity in the moral flaws of jokes we find amusing. The truth 
is, I think, much less comforting. We may not be proud of it, but we may sometimes be 
amused because of implicit biases and not merely because of our reactions to 
outrageousness and other comic elements in jokes that have moral flaws. It is therefore 
not unreasonable to engage in self-reflection after having laughed at a joke that we 
subsequently judge to be immoral, and this suggests we might stand to learn something 
important about ourselves if we take the time to work through the moral implications of 
our own amusement. 
Scott Woodcock is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria in 
British Columbia, Canada. His current interests are normative and applied ethics, and 
his work appears in journals such as Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice and Bioethics. This blog post is based on his paper ‘Comic Immoralism and 
Relatively Funny Jokes‘, published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy.  
Image credit: Arlso Bates, ‘07/26‘ 	
